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abstract: This paper is intended to fill the gap in the literature on 
moral hazard amongst companies. It seeks to explore the moral hazard 
for companies by linking the leverage range with the risk involuntarily 
assumed by third parties. The paper takes the distinctive approach of 
trying to understand the nature of the moral hazard affected not only 
through asymmetries but also through lack of resources in companies. 
The paper also seeks to establish the importance of companies’moral 
hazard from an ethical perspective and proposes an index –the mo- 
ral hazard index– which provides the option of reducing risk when man-
agers make (moral) decisions on leverage and equity levels; subsequently 
the assumed risk is controlled. An extreme case is set out of companies 
that have such high leverage that they survive with negative equity (some-
times also known as zombie companies). In such cases the assumption of 
risk by third parties is undeniable. The paper explains the problem and 
shows the concern regarding company leverage. Although the index is 
still only theoretical, it offers opportunities for improvement to determine 
its applications and utility. Moral decisions are expected to be taken with 
regard to the structure of the capital of companies in order to reduce the 
risk assumed by third parties.
Keywords: stakeholder, assumed risk, ethic, value, responsibility, 
loss, decision-making, strategy, trust.
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INtroDuctIoN
If, as Krugman (2009: 127) states, the multiplication of profits and 
losses depends on the degree of financial leverage, some ethical responsi-
bility must exist amongst those who make the decision on this leverage 
when multiplication of losses is distributed among a group of stakehold-
ers who have not previously consented to assuming it, and who in all 
cases do not participate equally or similarly in the distribution of the 
possible multiplication of profits.
Decision-making of company managers depends on a number of fac-
tors, including inter alia situations, relationships, information, values and 
feelings. However, the decision by the manager of a company to increase 
leverage or reduce equity will mark and predetermine its behaviour with 
the stakeholders with which it does business. Indeed, such moral hazard 
in companies is committed by the decision makers and assumed by other 
stakeholders or third parties. The causes may be not only informational 
asymmetries, but also power or temporal asymmetries. However, other 
determinants such as the lack of resources might also affect their decisions; 
and subsidiarily, these decisions will influence the decisions, intentions, 
relationships and finance of stakeholders. This paper therefore develops 
a theoretical index with the aim of reducing the assumed moral hazard 
in companies, after first explaining their importance and determinants. 
There is a gap in the literature on moral hazard in companies which this 
paper seeks to fill not only by explaining the problem of moral hazard 
in companies, but also by proposing a theoretical index that will reduce 
and control this risk.
The most important implications reveal that there is an ethical prob-
lem regarding decisions on the capital structure of companies. Moral 
hazard, in addition to business risk, exists when a company’s capital is 
based on high level of leverage or reduced equity. Negative equity is an 
extreme case of this. However, there is an option for reducing moral 
hazard in order to limit damage to third parties.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
foundations, contextualizing and defining the point of view and delimit-
ing the problem linking moral hazard and leverage. Section 3 describes 
the problem of moral hazard in companies. The following two sections 
describe the determinants of moral hazard from a company view; section 
4 describes different types of asymmetries that might affect it and section 
5 addresses the lack of resources and the stakeholder’s point of view. Sec-
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tion 6 offers an extreme example, the case of negative-equity companies. 
Finally, the last section puts forward a proposal for a moral hazard index 
based on level of leverage intended to reduce induction of risk to third 
parties without their knowledge. The paper ends with an outline of the 
main conclusions and suggestions for future research.
1.  Moral haZarD aND BusINess DecIsIoNs: claryfING 
aND exPlaINING coNcePts froM DIffereNt theorIes 
(GaMe, aGeNcy, aND stakeholDer theory)
Moral hazard arises in any situation in which a person makes a decision 
whose result benefits him if things go well, while someone else bears the 
cost if things go badly (Krugman, 2009). Beim & Calomiris (2001) explain 
the concept as a “heads I win, tails someone else loses” commitment. 
Simplifying matters, in such a situation the agents clearly have an incen-
tive to place their own interests above those of third parties who might 
be affected by their actions.
The term ‘moral hazard’ has a long history; its first documented use 
is in Arthur Ducat’s “The Practice of Fire Underwriting” (Ducat 1865, 
cited in Baker 1996: 249), referring to behaviour that increases the risk 
of insurance loss (Dembe & Boden, 2000). In economics, however, the 
concept (though not the term) was first discussed by Adam Smith (1776) 
in his analysis of joint-stock companies, in what might be considered a 
forerunner of today’s agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Interest-
ingly, it was Edmund Burke (1890) –in his diatribe against the republican 
democracy of the French Revolution– who helped propagate the concept.
More recently, the term was reintroduced by Arrow (1971, 1985) and 
Pauly (1968), with the latter disassociating it from the field of morals 
and transferring it to the area of game theory. As a result of the Arrow-
Pauly debate, the concept of “moral hazard” spread beyond the strict 
bounds of economic theory and entered common parlance (Rowell & 
Connelly, 2012) to describe a very diverse range of phenomena, includ-
ing unemployment benefits (Foster & Rosenzweig, 1994; Chelius & 
Kavanaugh, 1988), rural sharecropping (Cheung, 1969), the stock market 
(Diamond, 1967) and even family conduct (Becker, 1981).
While in the insurance field, “moral hazard” was always associated 
with a type of moral conduct, acquiring normative connotations (Baker, 
1996), in the field of economics a more positive perspective, free from 
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moral connotations (Haynes, 1895; Rubinow, 1913; Knight, 1921) was 
adopted practically from the outset. It was this interpretation that was 
later picked up again by Arrow and Pauly. However, this supposedly 
positive perspective may only be considered in isolation from a moral 
perspective, if we accept the anthropological assumption of “homo eco-
nomicus” as a determinant of human conduct; if humans seek only and 
rationally to maximize economic profit, there should be no need to make 
reference to moral conduct, given that the person’s action will depend 
solely on the economic incentives provided by his or her environment. 
However, since Simon (1955) this anthropological conception has been 
called into question and the importance of a person’s cognitive process as 
a true decider, in which moral reflection is a fundamental element, has 
become particularly relevant. This paradigm reconciles the normative 
and the positive perspective, even if the former centres on the particular 
person who decides and acts from a position of freedom, and the latter 
refers to the determinism of large numbers.
Moral hazard has been studied and explained by game theory, agency 
relationship and stakeholder theory. For example, the difference with the 
classic situation of game theory (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994) is that 
on the one hand, the result depends on the situation and not on the be-
haviour of the other participant or participants (passive agents), and on 
the other, that the result is always positive for the decider. From a selfish 
perspective, therefore, the best option of a rational homo economicus 
would be to engage in “moral hazard”.
In an agency relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), moral hazard is 
explained by the fact that the agent can seek to increase the benefit to 
himself by increasing the medium and long-term risk to the principals. 
Clearly, the agent incurs moral hazard vis-à-vis the principal, although 
an updating of that risk need not necessarily depend solely on external 
incentives. Instead it depends largely on the subject’s process of moral 
reasoning and his or her personal alignment with the interests of the prin-
cipal, as rediscovered in the Stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997). Given that individual utilitarian motivation is unneces-
sary, albeit possible, this is a situation of moral decision, where the possibil-
ity of passing moral hazard on to a third party is one to be evaluated.
However, moral hazard in a firm is not limited solely to the relation-
ship between agent and principal. Under stakeholder theory (Freeman, 
1984), for example, the responsibility of the managers may be considered 
to extend not only to the principal, but also to all the stakeholders who 
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participate in creating value or even those who, although not participat-
ing, are affected by the organisation’s activity. Without needing to take 
a multifiduciary approach, in which stakeholders are viewed as principals 
(Goodpaster, 1991; Boatright, 1994), the manager may be considered to 
incur moral hazard when his or her action involves risks to third parties 
that they have not explicitly accepted. From this perspective, any com-
mitment assumed on the basis of an explicit or implicit contractual rela-
tionship, in which doubts exist as to possible compliance, involves moral 
hazard.
2.  Moral haZarD aND leveraGe: DelIMItING  
the ProBleM
There is a gap in the literature on the study of moral hazard from a 
company perspective, but in practical company decision-making there is 
a problem arising out of the assumption of unexpected risks for third 
parties. This paper therefore centres on the possible moral hazard assumed 
by the manager of a firm vis-à-vis third parties, within the framework 
of his or her regular activity; and specifically, on whether it is possible to 
create instruments that allow that risk to be identified and reduced.
Within the course of its regular economic activity, a firm assumes 
commitments with third parties, inter alia employees, providers, govern-
ment, financiers, customers, partners and the general public, as well as its 
shareholders. In a new firm, it is quite simple to identify the relationship 
between equity and commitments on investment and payment, since 
there is usually a strong correlation between stable funding and fixed assets 
(Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999). As business develops, however, the 
current assets and liabilities increase, and it becomes increasingly difficult 
to identify resources with payment commitments. The accounts cer-
tainly reflect a faithful image of the company. However, the fact that 
assets and liabilities balance out can mislead one into believing that the 
company is meeting all its debts. An example of that “deception” can be 
seen in the extreme case studied in this paper of companies with negative 
equity. Thus, when a firm completes its activity, there is usually a mis-
match between the realization value of the assets and the sum of the lia-
bilities, generally as a result of the specific circumstances of the assets and 
the transaction costs associated with the need for immediate sale. This 
disparity is usually made up with part of the organisation’s equity. If there 
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is enough equity, the company should be able to complete the business 
and meet all of its commitments to third parties (see Urionabarrenetxea, 
San-Jose & Retolaza, 2016 for empirical data about this argumentation).
The balance sheet therefore shows equilibrium between the company’s 
assets and, at least in part, the financial commitments it has acquired with 
the different stakeholders. Clearly, the greater the organisation’s equity, 
the greater its capacity to meet its commitments in adverse situations, for 
which reason very high leverage can not only affect the company’s sus-
tainability, but can also lead to an insufficiency of resources to meet the 
commitments it has acquired with third parties (Biais & Casamatta, 1999).
In contrast, low levels of borrowing tend to entail a lower yield on 
equity and, therefore, a cost for shareholders (John & Senbe, 1998). An 
increase in leverage can help increase the yield on equity, but at the cost 
of increasing the risk of non-payment. In this case, therefore, the inter- 
ests of the shareholders and the risk for other stakeholders appear to be 
in opposition, reflecting a possible case of “moral hazard” by the decision-
maker, whether this is the principal (shareholder) or an agent delegated 
by the principal. In theoretical terms, one might establish a correlation of 
inverse risk between the capitalists and the third parties participating in 
a firm’s business activity. There are therefore, ceteris paribus, two pos-
sible situations in the event of an increase in the company’s capital. The 
first one arises when the economic result is positive; in this case, an increase 
in the company’s capital will correspond to a decrease in the return on 
equity (ROE) obtained. The second one arises when the accumulated 
economic result is negative; in this case the increase in capital in the com-
pany will correspond to an increase in the risk assumed by the sharehold-
ers and will make it possible to reduce the risk of non-payment to third 
parties related to the company. On the other hand, a decrease in the 
capital will mean increasing the return and reducing the assumed risk 
affecting shareholders; the effect on possible creditors will be to reduce 
the assurance of being paid, with no apparent consideration in return, 
clearly leaving third parties at a disadvantage.
3.  Moral haZarD GeNeratIoN Process:  
asyMMetrIes vIeW
For moral hazard to exist, there must be some form of asymmetry; 
the simple risk associated with present or potential profit cannot be con-
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sidered moral hazard if it has been adopted in full consent under the 
conditions set out by Donaldson and Dunfee (1999, 2000a and 2000b). 
According to the literature (Hill & Jones, 1992; Donaldson & Preston, 
1995; Richardson, 2000; Cai, Qian, & Yu, 2015) there are four types 
of asymmetry that might be considered to generate moral hazard in a 
company: asymmetries of information, asymmetries of power, asym-
metries of trust or responsibility and temporal asymmetries.
These asymmetries, as we shall see, have previously been investigated 
as causes of moral hazard. Asymmetry of information is by far the most 
extensively researched type (Hölmstrom, 1979; Bernardo, Cain & Luo, 
2001), since the use of information of unequal quality by the agents in-
volved affects risks in business decision making; mismatches in informa-
tion can cause third parties to assume risks because they are not suffi-
ciently informed. Asymmetry of power (Dawkins, 2014; 2015) occurs 
when the affected party does not have the capacity to oppose the situation 
of risk being considered by the decision-making party. This can arise, for 
example, in situations of economic dependency, cash needs, or direct or 
indirect power. The common feature of all such situations is that the 
capacity for negotiation and decision-making of one of the parties is more 
limited than that of the other. For example, a large number of EU coun-
tries have introduced legislation relating to payment periods, in response 
to public disquiet over this type of asymmetry of power. The third type, 
asymmetry of trust or responsibility, arises when the affected party’s 
expectations of the decider are not matched by a similar level of respon-
sibility in the opposite direction. An example can be seen in the case of 
Spanish preferred and perpetual stock. This situation may be considered 
an extension of the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and to lie 
outside the domain of governance, since there already exists a delegation 
of decision-making and a responsibility on the part of the agent to safeguard 
the interests of the principal. Similarly, it is not only aspects related to 
rationality that are relevant in this type of asymmetry, but also emo-
tional aspects, where trust becomes a constituent element of the personal 
relationship itself. Finally, the fourth type of asymmetry is temporal 
asymmetry, whereby there may be a present benefit for the decision-
making party linked to a situation of future risk or uncertainty arising as 
to the results to be obtained by the affected party. One specific case of 
temporal asymmetry is that of cash asymmetry, where the company’s 
equity acts as a security that the commitment will be fulfilled regardless 
of the uncertainty introduced into the system by future economic events
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Given that the principal mechanisms generating moral hazard that we 
have identified are asymmetries, it is worth considering to which extent 
the solution to this risk lies in achieving symmetry, rather than seeking 
answers in the structure of the company’s capital. The fact is that it is 
practically impossible to reduce these asymmetries to zero. Of the four 
types, perhaps the easiest to reduce is asymmetry of information. None-
theless, while this may be feasible for small quantities of information, it 
is entirely unviable in a complex economic system with multiple different 
inter-relations, where the information on each one now tends towards 
the infinite. To take the case of the suppliers, for example; even if they 
were to assume that their customers were entirely transparent and that 
there was no problem of a lag in information, for small companies it 
would be entirely impossible to analyse the overall information of the 
company in sufficient detail to be able to say for certain that there is no 
asymmetry of information. It is important to bear in mind that the asym-
metry of information is so great that it undoubtedly also exists within the 
same firm between different stakeholders or indeed among the same 
stakeholders. One solution is to delegate the analysis of information to a 
professional third-party, albeit this may introduce new asymmetries and 
possible agency issues. One might even transfer the risk to third parties, 
for example by taking out credit insurance.
Nonetheless, this is only a partial solution, since such policies only 
cover part of the debt or certain types of non-payment or company; and 
they are expensive, when the process should have no cost. Moreover, not 
only does it not resolve the moral hazard, it may even help to provide a 
justification for it; the company indulging in moral hazard might think 
that because the creditor company has the resources to meet the possible 
risk, the situation is one of normal business risk rather than moral hazard. 
This system, outsourcing the responsibility as it does to third parties, 
would appear unlikely to guide the market towards more ethical and 
responsible behaviour; on the contrary, it leads to a general increase in 
the transactional costs of a given economy.
4.  Moral haZarD GeNeratIoN Process for 
stakeholDers. What haPPeNs WheN there  
Is a lack of resources IN a coMPaNy?
One constantly hears examples of companies that have been unable 
to fulfil their contracts with employees; that have stopped paying provid-
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ers; that cannot provide the services or guarantees promised to customers 
or that have failed to pay major amounts owed to public authorities; in 
all these cases there has been a dereliction of compliance with the ex-
plicit contractual obligations (contracts with providers, employees and 
customers) and implicit obligations (commitments to customers and 
under law) assumed by the organization. As can be seen in Table 1 mere 
ex-post non-compliance, although incontrovertibly proving that a risk 
has existed (because of the resulting negative impact), does not necessar-
ily presuppose the existence of moral hazard, at least in the regulatory 
sense of the term; the decider may have considered the risk to third par-
ties to be non-existent in the ex-ante moment of making the decision, 
either because the risk appeared to be null, based on available information, 
or because it was unexpected. Unquestionably the decider may also have 
taken a decision that benefited him in full awareness of the effect on third 
parties, regardless of how likely he considered the materialization of that 
risk to be; if so, then this is a clear case of moral hazard. Within the risk 
/ benefit framework, he may also have taken the decision he considered 
most beneficial for those third parties. In this case, the issue is not one of 
moral hazard, but of decision making in conditions of uncertainty.
table 1. moral hazard and uncertainty
aGent 1
aGent 2
Situation/Results Wrong Risk 
Assessment
Moral Hazard Decisions in 
Uncertainty 
situation
Optimal Results 1(+)
2(+)
1(+)
2(+/ 0)
1(+)
2(+)
Worst Results 1(+/0)
2(–)
1(+/0)
2(–)
1(+/0)
2(–)
There are three possible scenarios regarding the assumption of risk. 
In wrong risk assessment situations and in situations of uncertainty, agent 
1 seeks the benefit of agent 2, besides his/her own benefit, so both will 
result in optimum benefit (++). In the case of moral hazard, agent 1 
seeks its own benefit (+) regardless of the result for agent 2, so in optimal 
conditions agent 2 may be benefited or not (+/0). But the fundamental 
difference occurs in adverse circumstances, as in the situation of moral 
hazard agent 1 gets benefit (+) even though agent 2 gets losses (–). In 
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wrong risk assessment situations and in situations of uncertainty, the 
injury to agent 2 (–) usually is not accompanied by a benefit for agent 
1(0). This independent benefit of the risk is not only the key to moral 
hazard, but also its main motivation.
This study focuses on the determinants of moral hazard; and espe-
cially on the way they can be used by managers to identify and avoid 
situations of third-party risk, just as liquidity and cash ratios can be used 
by managers to avoid situations of non-payment. In this line, Boatright 
(2011: 158) concludes that “there are at least three explanations for why 
corporations would seek, in practice, to manage risks despite the theo-
retical premise that such attempts provide no benefit to shareholders”. 
Any view of risk can be explained or measured in terms of a ratio, such 
as the ratio here linked to moral hazard. This is helpful in eliminating or 
at least controlling the moral hazard passed on to third parties.
Undoubtedly, the leverage reflects a certain degree of risk, since in 
most cases, the money owed by the company, or at least, part of it, can-
not be realized in the short-term. Nonetheless, for moral hazard to exist, 
the existence of a business risk is not in itself enough, since on most oc-
casions this risk is assumed consciously within the profit/risk framework 
associated with any type of investment. Therefore, no type of moral 
hazard would appear to exist towards shareholders when they decide to 
invest their capital in a business project. Decisions regarding long-term 
liabilities are similar. In general, the financial institutions have information 
and instruments to analyse a firm’s risk. Unless fraudulent information 
is provided –in which case the manager would be directly committing a 
crime– it would be very difficult for a company to pass on a hidden risk 
to the financial institution. Complementarily, financial institutions gener-
ally have legal devices to ensure that the repayment of their debt is pri-
oritized over that of other creditors. Given the quality of information 
and the capacity of analysis, a financial institution in a process of long-term 
financing can be considered to have the necessary instruments to make a 
suitable risk / benefit analysis, and the risk will therefore be freely and 
consciously assumed, with no occurrence of moral hazard.
So who would such third-party risk substantially affect? Although the 
individual casuistry undoubtedly varies from one firm to another, it would 
normally affect short-term creditors, normally suppliers, workers, govern-
ment (VAT, social security, etc.); and those holding present or future 
rights not updated on the books, such as customer returns or warrantees, 
litigants or those with entitlements to restoration –e.g. environmental– 
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which might well also include the government, and –directly or indi-
rectly– the general public related to the company and to government 
creditors. There may also be some form of long-term creditor, in gen-
eral where there has been some problem of asymmetry of information, 
as was the case with the Spanish “preferred shares”1.
5.  the NeGatIve eQuIty coMPaNIes vIeW: a sPace  
of aNalysIs
Although in theory it is possible to identify the maximum degree of 
leverage beyond which any increase in borrowing would entail moral 
hazard, in practice it is very complicated given the delimitation required. 
However, one can establish the cut-off points, which can be used to de-
termine the differentiating factors. At the high end of the scale, if the debt 
ratio (the ratio of external debt2 to equity) is below 1, there is a guarantee 
that whatever the situation, the company will be able to satisfy its exter-
nal debts to third parties. At the other end, extreme leverage occurs in 
companies with negative equity, whose leverage ratio will always be in-
finite. In such cases, it is certain that if the company goes out of business, 
it will be unable to meet all its external debts. Any increase in borrowing 
would therefore appear to involve moral hazard, unless there is complete 
symmetry with the party potentially affected.
Net worth –or equity– can be defined as the difference between assets 
and external debt; in a financially healthy firm, the equity should be 
positive and preferably greater than the subscribed share capital; compa-
nies only have negative equity when successive losses in their business 
activity have led them to use up all of their subscribed capital. In many 
countries, especially in the European Union, a firm that loses all its eq-
uity as a result of consecutive operating losses becomes technically bank-
rupt and is required to increase its equity or cease trading (Correa, 
1 Since 2008 Spanish financial entities greatly increased the sale of preferred shares 
among retail customers. The Organization of Consumers and Users (OCU) estimates 
that at least 80% of buyers were over 65 years old and they showed a tendency to buy 
this financial product without knowing what they were buying, simply because they 
trusted the entity that was selling them. 3 years later, when the last issue had been placed, 
the outstanding amount of preferred shares in the hands of retailers was close to 30,000 
million euros (data CNMV), most of which have lost 40%-65% of their nominal value.
2 The external debt is referred to liabilities except of shareholder funds.
Ramon Llull Journal_07.indd   153 30/05/16   11:56
154 raMoN llull JourNal of aPPlIeD ethIcs 2016. Issue 7 PP. 143-166
Acosta & González, 2003), since it lacks the resources to ensure collection 
of liabilities. This creates the paradoxical situation that any residual risk 
is passed on to third parties, whereas any residual profit would go to the 
shareholders – who are not actually risking any capital, given that they 
have already lost it all. As can be seen, this would be a clear situation of 
moral hazard on the part of the shareholders – and also the management, 
if they receive positive incentives to prolong this situation.
Here we can demonstrate, in theory at least, that there are two con-
sequences that negatively influence stakeholders in companies with nega-
tive equity. On the one hand, the assets are not sufficient to meet the li-
abilities, and therefore if the company goes out of business it would be 
unable to meet all of the financial commitments it has assumed with third 
parties. On the other, the principle of balance between risk and decision-
making is broken, and the shareholders manage the decision-making rights 
at no risk, since the capital with which the company operates is not its 
own, but loaned by third parties.
It would be easy to imagine that the number of such cases is negligible, 
and in all cases the situation is very limited in duration; however, it is a 
relatively common phenomenon in Europe and companies in this situa-
tion have an accumulated negative equity of around €1.16 trillion 
(Amadeus database, 2015). Business literature on moral hazard is not 
scarce in general, but there is not a huge literature focus on the analysis 
of the moral hazard in companies. However, there are a number of arti-
cles on ‘zombie firms’ (Kane, 2012; Papworth, 2013), which are charac-
terised more by their negative cash flow than by negative equity. These 
studies (Ahearne & Shinada, 2005), appear to show when a significant 
number of such companies exist; they cause a deterioration in the business 
fabric, resulting in a reduction in employment and investment opportuni-
ties (Caballero, Hoshi & Kashyap, 2008).
One could undoubtedly point to the moral hazard generated by the 
group of agents –shareholders, management, regulators, financiers, etc.– 
who allow such zombie companies to continue to survive at the expense 
of business development. Nonetheless, the complexity of this problem 
greatly exceeds the scope of this study; in the case of companies with 
negative equity, there exists a situation of dynamic risk; going out of 
business would negatively affect third parties, whereas staying in business 
would avoid that risk being updated in the future if the company were 
to prove successful; but if it were not, it might further worsen the harm 
to third parties.
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6.  a Moral haZarD INDex ProPosal Base oN coMPaNy 
leveraGe
From the discussion thus far, one can identify two fundamental 
mechanisms for reducing the moral hazard incorporated by the manager. 
One is to provide complete symmetry –of information, power and re-
sponsibility– so that third parties assuming some form of risk of non-
payment, do so consensually, in such a way that where there exists a real 
risk for the creditor, the debtor does not generate moral hazard. We 
consider this course of action to be an interesting one and it should by no 
means be ruled out. Although we consider it difficult to achieve zero 
asymmetry, we believe that all efforts to reduce any kind of asymmetry 
have a positive impact in terms of generating a more ethical economic 
system. The second mechanism –entirely compatible with the latter– 
consists of maintaining a sufficient degree of economic guarantee to meet 
the commitments made to third parties, even in the event of poor perfor-
mance by the company.
The use of certain ratios as a system for guaranteeing payment are not 
a new feature in business management, and are generally referred to as 
covenants (Smith & Warner, 1979). Covenants may be viewed as agree-
ments, normally referencing financial ratios, which the debtor must 
fulfil in order for the loan to remain active; if these prearranged limits are 
exceeded, the debtor is considered to be in breach of the agreement and 
the borrower is entitled to cancel the loan and demand immediate pay-
ment of the full amount of the debt. Covenants have two purposes: on 
the one hand, they prevent the debtor company from performing opera-
tions that involve a risk for the lender; and on the other, if such a situation 
does arise, they allow the lender to recover the funds before there is any 
further deterioration in the situation which might make it unviable to 
call in the loan. This approach is consistent with classic studies by Jensen 
& Meckling (1976) and Smith & Warner (1979), which suggest that 
covenants serve to curb agency risk and reduce control costs.
As we have seen, covenants use a wide and varied series of financial 
ratios (Holthausen & Leftwich 1983; Dichev & Skinner 2002). These 
include: external debt to cash flow, interest coverage, fixed charge cover-
age, tangible net worth, net worth, debt to tangible net worth, debt service 
coverage, current ratio, senior debt to cash flow, cash interest coverage, 
debt to equity, leverage ratio, etc. Nonetheless, one can distinguish be-
tween two broad types (Christensen & Nikolaev, 2012). The first group 
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includes capital covenants, which are based on information on the 
sources and uses of the capital, particularly information from the balance 
sheet. The second group are performance covenants, which are based on 
results, as obtained mainly from the operating account. This information 
is sometimes used on its own and sometimes in combination with data 
from the balance sheets.
Most European countries have opted to include a covenant in the 
legislation based on the ratio between equity and subscribed capital; if this 
falls below a given ratio, the company has a short period of time to choose 
between replenishing the lost capital to within admissible limits or going 
out of business. However, as we have seen in the previous section, in a 
large percentage of cases, this condition is not fulfilled3. Clearly, the pur-
pose of establishing a minimum ratio of equity to subscribed capital is to 
ensure symmetry of information, by ensuring that the information fur-
nished in official documents sufficiently matches the real situation. None-
theless, this requirement offers no great advance in the degree of risk as-
sumed by third party creditors, since the share capital does not necessar-
ily bear any relation to the company’s volume of business, or to its liabil-
ities. If one is to continue along the path of the net assets, it would appear 
more appropriate to impose some requirement referring to leverage; since 
in the event of the company’s closing down, this is the factor that will 
determine whether all third-party debts can be honoured. According to 
a recent study (Graham et al., 2014) the ratio of net worth to liabilities 
among companies has fallen from 75% in 1930 to just 35% in 1990; 
which, ceteris paribus, has led to a considerable increase in the moral 
hazard generated by companies as a whole. As already discussed, low 
levels of leverage would appear to benefit creditors, since a larger volume 
of funds is available for possible repayments; on the other hand, a high 
level of leverage theoretically benefits shareholders, since more business 
can be done with the same capital, and, in the event of profits, the return 
on their capital will therefore be greater. However, if one takes the balance 
sheet as a reference, it is difficult to ascertain the threshold of leverage 
beyond which a company enters into moral hazard, since in theory, only 
3 The previous section only takes into account the case of companies with negative 
equity, where it is clear that the company does not in any case have equity with which 
to honour its debts with third parties. However the covenant established in the legisla-
tion tends to be much more demanding; in Spain, for example, a ratio of over 50% of 
subscribed equity is required.
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companies with negative equity would be incapable of balancing their 
books without damaging third parties if they were to go out of business; 
in all other cases, they would only have to liquidate their assets to meet 
their liabilities, with a greater or lesser loss sustained exclusively by the 
shareholders. Thus, the risk of loss appears to fall exclusively on the share- 
holders, who are assumed to have taken the risk/profit binomial into 
account when deciding to invest; and alternatively they have the mecha-
nisms provided by the market to disinvest as they see fit if they consider 
the risk to be excessive. And in any event, if any problem were to exist, 
this could be correctly explained by the agency theory.
Despite this theoretical balance, the reality shows that this is not the 
case; in the current economic crisis, there have been countless cases of 
companies closing down, where not only have the shareholders lost their 
investment, but multiple creditors have failed to recover the monies owed 
to them: suppliers, workers, government, customers, etc. It is obvious 
that the supposed equilibrium of the balance sheets has not worked. The 
reason is that the theoretical value of the assets does not correspond to 
their real disposal value at that point in time. Leaving to one side the ef-
fects of inadequate accounting –for example, possible overvaluation 
through the effect of reduced depreciation or an over-optimistic estimate 
of the volume of non-payments– the fact is that a significant volume of 
assets are idiosyncratic, and lack value outside the productive structure of 
the company (this is the case with most intangible assets and specific in-
stallations). The simple fact is that a company’s residual assets, which 
must be used to pay creditors, are worth very much less than its real assets; 
the few studies conducted on the subject (Kaplan 1989; Holland, 1990; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1992; Recio, 2011), suggest a depreciation of between 
50% and 70%. This high degree of variability is due to the fact that the 
percentage of residual assets depends on a variety factors, such as com-
pany size, industry and the business model itself. The main reason for 
this lies in intangible assets, which value usually is attached to the rest of 
the company, not being strippable; these difficult their economic trans-
missibility. Therefore, the economic value of intangibles depends on the 
continuation of the business relationship of which they are part. The 
presence of such assets limits the leverage capacity of the company (Vi-
cente, 2001). It would seem, then, that in order to determine whether 
the company can really honour its external debts to third parties, one 
would have to identify the organisation’s residual assets and deduct the 
overall liabilities, except for the net worth. This would give a more ac-
curate idea of the risk of non-payment assumed by third parties.
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Nonetheless, it should be noted that this risk is not distributed evenly 
among all creditors. Long-term and institutional creditors (financial in-
stitutions and government) normally have preferential rights of payment 
and the balance available to other creditors is therefore reduced in propor-
tion. Suppliers, aware of this problem, tend to make a preliminary 
analysis of their customers and take our credit insurance. However, ac-
cepting such a situation as normal, as well as making the system more 
expensive, implies a presumption of the debtor’s irresponsibility, a very 
dangerous step from a legal and (especially) a moral perspective. In any 
contractual situation, the debtor should take responsibility for repaying 
the amount owing, unless the contract makes it clear that this is an op-
eration of assumed risk and sets out the conditions thereof. One must 
consider to what extent moral hazard can be adduced in a debt with in-
stitutional investors and bondholders, where the profit/risk binomial has 
already been incorporated into the operation. However, if creditors es-
tablish some form of guarantee of preferred status, the risk of residual 
non-payment will fall precisely on those operators who do not act on the 
basis of a profit/risk binomial, but are merely charging for their labour, 
service or rights, as agreed normally on a zero-risk basis.
In any case, the covenants established by the financial institutions for 
credit operations commonly use financial leverage, which could be factored 
in using the following formula:
LTD + STD + Guarantees + outstanding bonds, guarantees and 
promissory notes – Cash and Banks – STFI (short-term financial 
investments) – Treasury stock (market value) / Net Worth
As can be seen, in this formula, the residual value of the assets is 
irrelevant, since only the short-term realizable value has been taken into 
account. A ratio less than or equal to 1 would mean that the company 
can meet third party payments, even in the event of a sudden cessation 
of its business activity. From there, any reduction below this would 
imply an increase in the moral hazard assumed, which up to a certain 
percentage could be balanced against the potential realisation of the 
residual assets; after which moral hazard towards third parties would 
exist.
In order to factor in the potential of the residual assets, and thus make 
the formula less demanding, one could include the forecast liquidation in 
the numerator as follows:
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LTD (long-term debts) + STD (short-term debts) + Guarantees + 
Outstanding bonds, guarantees and promissory notes – Cash and 
banks – STFI (short-term financial investments) – Treasury stock 
(market value) – Residual value of assets (excluding cash and 
banks) / Net worth ≤ 1
The more the ratio falls below 1, the more the moral hazard incurred 
by the manager, who is endorsing a potential risk of non-payment to 
third parties. Unquestionably, like any other economic/financial ratio, 
this index will not be decisive in the decision, but it will be a factor in the 
manager’s process of ethical deliberation, given that the likelihood of the 
company’s going out of business will undoubtedly be a fundamental 
component in any decision. An increase in the risk of leverage combined 
with a zero risk of bankruptcy should apparently have no consequences 
for third parties; on the other hand, low percentages of residual risk of 
non-payment combined with a high risk of bankruptcy require a more 
complex moral decision. In this regard, it is worth noting that one of the 
criticisms levelled against capital covenants (Christensen & Nikolaev, 
2012) is that they are excessively static, as compared to performance 
covenants. At the same time, this type of indicator necessarily refers to 
the past, whereas the decisions that must be taken by the decider will be 
in the future; it might therefore be helpful to include a performance fac-
tor –forecast annual cash flow– in the index to turn it into a mixed indi-
cator, which we believe would have greater potential.
LTD (long-term debts) + STD (short-term debts) + Guarantees + 
Outstanding bonds, guarantees and promissory notes – Cash and 
banks – STFI (short-term financial investments) – Treasury stock 
(market value) – Residual value of assets (excluding cash and 
banks) – Forecast cash flow for current year / Net worth ≤ 1
In a more summarised form, one could establish a moral hazard index 
(MOHAI) as follows:
MOHAI = Payable Liabilities – Residual Assets – Cash flow / Net 
worth ≤ 1 →
m = 
Adv
Nw
 ≤ 1
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Where:
m = moral hazard index, Mohai
Adv = Adjusted Debt Value = Pl-Ra-Cf
Pl = Payable Liabilities = LTD + STD + guarantees + outstanding 
bonds, guarantees and promissory notes
Ra = Residual Assets= Cash and Banks – STFI (short-term financial 
investments) – Treasury stock (market value) – residual value of the 
remaining assets (estimate)
Cf = Cash Flow in current year (estimate)
Nw = Net Worth= Equity + reserves – accumulated losses
coNclusIoNs
The study is twofold: on the one hand, it addresses to show the exist-
ence of a moral hazard related to high levels of leverage, and on the 
other hand, to provide an index that serves to manage this risk responsi-
bly by managers. So far, this type of moral hazard has been little analyzed 
since from a financial perspective the premise is assumed that a raise of 
leverage optimizes the result for shareholders, and from an ethical perspec-
tive it is seen as a set of technical decisions oblivious to ethical reflection. 
The crisis of 2008 has settled the theoretical discussion, highlighting the 
risk endorsed by the financial system to third parties: bailouts, unpaid 
liabilities, dismissals, preferred shares, ground clauses, threat of systemic 
risk and so on. From the financial sector itself (Basel III / IV) regulators 
recognize the link between risk and leverage, compelling banks to increase 
quickly their capital requirements.
But beyond this example, despite its importance, the article reveals that 
leverage can be a moral hazard in many other sectors, and also that it is a 
widespread problem in the European Union, as shown by the data on the 
number of companies with negative equity and the cumulative volume of 
the same. We may think that moral hazard takes place when the decision-
maker endorses the risk to a third party to obtain personal gain. This 
occurs when a company does not have enough assets to respond to liabil-
ities and shareholders make risk decisions when funds they are using come 
from borrowings, given that they have already lost their own funds.
Certainly moral hazard linked to leverage is not a one-dimensional 
decision; on the contrary it turns on a complex decision, since the firm’s 
cessation of business is also going to cause injury to many of its partici-
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pants, even when it is an orderly shutdown. In this regard we believe that 
the decision on the degree of moral hazard taken in specific circum-
stances becomes a moral problem for the decision-maker, therefore it 
should be subject to ethical reflection.
Contextual factors involved in this risk, expectations of future perfor-
mance and conditions of asymmetry of information, bargaining power 
and responsibility, necessarily lead to a complex decision. In this sense 
MOHAI do not aim to be a technical element that exonerate the freedom 
of the decision-maker, but as with other indices, it aims to agglutinate 
complex information and facilitates the management decision process. 
We are not thinking of its use by egocentric managers who put their own 
interests above the other stakeholders’, but of responsible managers seek-
ing decisions that may optimize the result for the whole of the stakehold-
ers; thus, stakeholders would assume risk in an informed manner, con-
scious and free, according to the expected results. We think that once 
displayed the moral hazard problem associated leverage as an ethical 
problem, managers themselves will be interested in building instruments 
that help them improve the decision-making.
From the perspective of ethical research we are facing an emerging 
issue, hence its importance, inasmuch as it identifies a new problem in an 
area that until now had been considered highly technical. These are the 
major contributions: 1) To highlight the ethical perspective linked to 
moral hazard that occurs in the decisions on the financial leverage of the 
company. 2) To develop a proposed index, MOHAI, which use would 
facilitate decision-makers to know the degree of moral hazard endorsed 
to third parties based on the financial structure of the company; thus al-
lowing them to be aware of the moral implications of their decisions. 3) 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the integration of this approach can 
help visualize the problem of firms with negative equity the injury and 
systemic risk they generate for the whole economy of countries, and the 
entire European Union.
This work opens a new way and from it emerge several research lines; 
some of them are more technical in nature, related to the improvement 
of the index itself; others, on the extension of the ethical problem to 
other variables of the financial structure of an organization, are more 
ethical; and some research lines, such as those related to risk limits, belong 
to the political area.
The main limitation of this study is the lack of research on the resid-
ual value of the companies in bankruptcy proceedings, because although 
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we can easily conclude that a company with negative equity does not have 
resources to meet its liabilities, it is difficult to determine when the risk 
of leverage begins. Theoretically while equity is not negative, the asset 
should be able to meet the liabilities of the company, but as the residual 
value in bankruptcy proceedings is lower than the book value, this par-
ity is usually broken. To know, depending on sector, size and country, 
the asset in case of cessation of activity will allow tuning the moment in 
which moral hazard to others starts.
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